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Commerce and Banking: The German Case
The appropriate relationship between banking
and commerce is a central issue in the debate
over banking reform. Reluctance to allow their
commingling in the U.S. financial system has
been marked by concerns over self-dealing and
excessive risk-taking that may destabilize the
banking system and possible exploitation of the
bank safety net.
In this Letter, the effects of mixing banking and
commerce are discussed in light of the banking
experience in West Germany. In West Germany,
where "universal banking" is permitted, banks
engage directly in investment banking, insur-
ance, and real estate investment activities. They
also own (or exercise proxy rights over) large
blocks of shares in German industrial enter-
prises, and serve on the supervisory boards of
German corporations. Approximately 80 percent
of the 400 largest German corporations have
bankers on their management committees, and
about 15 percent of corporate equities are esti-
mated to be held by banks. Over half of the
shares of the top 100 or so German corporations
are voted by banks.
In addition, there is no law prohibiting owner-
ship of banks by commercial enterprises. One
finds banks (and other depository institutions)
owned by such diverse enterprises as bakeries,
automobile manufacturers, retailers, and insur-
ance companies. The German banking experi-
ence thus seems a natural laboratory for
examining the effects of commingling banking
and commerce.
Origins of German universal banking
German universal banks first appeared during
the 1850s to serve rapid industrial development.
The so-called Kreditbanken provided not only a
source of credit and payment services to indus-
try, but also investment banking services (such
as securities underwriting) and those of a
development bank or venture capital market. In
the latter role, they assisted in the start-up of
industrial enterprises by providing credit. The
credit was of medium-term, and would be
repaid with the proceeds of bondand stock iss-
uance once the firm became established.
Interlocks between banks and their industrial
customers arose out of these lending practices.
Because the activities for which bankswer~
lending were risky and untried, the banks
needed mechanisms to obtain good information
and, if necessary, control over the activities of
their industrial customers. Thus, the lending
agreements often required that banks be given a
say in the management of the firms, control over
how much borrowing the firm did elsewhere,
and rights to acquire equity interests in the firm.
As the firm's underwriter, the universal bank also
had some influence over the timing of bond and
stock issuance, which could be used to help
ensure that the conditions of the bank loan liqui-
dation were met.
The universal bank form was highly successful
and quickly replaced the existing form of bank-
ing organization - the "private bank", which
was not stockholder-owned and did not offer the
same broad range of services. Banks with broad
powers have remained dominant among Ger-
man financial institutions. In their various forms,
the universal banks today account for about 75
percent of German banking assets.
Improve efficiency?
A number of theoretical arguments can be made
in favor of universal banking-type links to com-
mercial firms. One is that the participation of the
bank in managing a firm that is borrowing funds
can facilitate efficient credit flow. Specifically,
some economists have argued that bank lending
is superior to open market financing for certain
types of projects because banks can econom-
ically monitor those projects on an ongoing
basis whereas credit markets cannot. It follows
from this argument that if banks can improve
their monitoring - by gaining entry to the inter-
nal decisionmaking processes of a firm, for
example, they can also identify and finance an
otherwise unexploited set of projects.
Another line of reasoning suggests that a bank,
by sirnultaneously lending to and owning the
equity of a corporation, can help control ineffi-
ciency arising from so-called "agency" prob-
lems in corporations. Agency problems ariseFRBSF
because management, which acts in the role of
"agent" for the debt- and equityholders of the
firm, may pursue goals that are inefficient and
self-serving ratherthangoals thatbenefit the
IiabiIityholders.
If the various liabilities of the firm were held by
separate investors, the only mechanism for con-
trolwould be fordebtholders to force the firm
into bankruptcyor for the equityholders to
remove incompetent management through
proxy fights. These m~chanisms are cumber-
some; moreover, debt- and equityholders may
have conflicting interests in effecting such
change. The prevalence of agency problems and
the difficulties of exerting control over an
"open" corporation are believed by some to
have stimulated the corporate takeover move-
ment in the United States.
If, instead, a bank were to own the full range of
classes of both the firm's debt and equity, the
bank could gain the control necessary to effect
re-organization much more economically. The
covenants ofthe loans and other IiabiIities can
be designed to givethe bank progr~ssively
greater authority to intercede in the management
of thefirm as dividend and interest payment per-
formance deteriorates. Moreover, because the
debtholderis also the equityholder, there are no
conflicts between holders of debt and equity
securities to impede a needed re-organization.
The result would be fewer agency problems,
lower costs in "work-outs" of financial prob-
lems, and a resultant increase in organizational
efficiency.
Anecdotal evidence
Proponents of universal banking claim that the
system has indeedimproved the efficiency of
Germany's economy.. Alexander Gerschenkron
and others, for example, believe that the empiri-
cal record implies thatuniversal banking con-
tributed tothe rapid paceof German industrial
development. (It is interesting to note in this
regard that Japan, which presents another exam-
ple of rapid economic development, also tradi-
tionally permitted affiliation of commerce and
banking in theform of Zaibatsu groups.)
Also consistent withthe theoretical rationale for
universalbanking is the fact that bank loans are
the m~jorsourceof industrial credit, particularly
for larger corporations in Germany. (About 70
percent of external corporate funding is obtained
from banks in Germany, versus only about 25
percent in the U.5.) That is, the purely "open"
form of corporation, with direct placement of
corporate debt, seems unable to compete with
firms financed with the help of universal banks.
The fact that universal banks' creditor relation-
ships tend to be with larger corporations also is
to be expected because agency problems are
likely to be more serious for larger and more
complex organizations.
Finally, in Germany, corporate takeovers are
rare by U.5. standards, and banks are involved
more frequently in major workouts of a firms'
problems and in replacement of its manage-
ment. This, too, is consistent with the notion that
universal banking may help resolve corporate
control problems.
Interestingly, a type of financing - called "strip
financing" - that is used in corporate restruc-
turings in the U.S. in recent years can be seen as
a variant of universal bank-type financing. In
strip financing, creditors own a bit of each type
of the firm's liabilities. This gives them the type
of control that universal banks enjoy as both a
lender and an equityholder in their client firms.
Other views
The view of universal banks as an efficiency-
enhancing form of financial organization is not
universally held. Within modern Germany, there
is concern about the concentration of economic
power that some feel results from the inter-
locking ownership of banking and commercial
firms. They argue, for example, that these inter-
locks result in limited credit flows to smaller
firms. The German Federal Monopolies Com-
mission recently recommended that banks be
allowed to own no more than 5 percent of the
shares of a nonbank firm rather than the 25 per-
cent limit enforced currently.
Another broad area of concern raised by the
practice of universal banking is its effects on the
stability of the banking system itself. In particu-
lar, can a bank that offers lending, investment
banking, and securities trading services, and that
has equity interests in nonbank firms (or vice
versa) avoid conflicts of interest that may
generate losses of confidence and destabilize the
banking system?Economists argue that competition is the bank
customers' main protection against a bank trying
to benefit itself or others at the customers'
expense. A bank that is not careful to avoid con-
flicts of interest risks losing its customers (and
reputation) to other banking firms. There is little
evidence that German banking suffers from
insufficient competition. At present there are
approximately 4800 banks able to provide uni-
versal banking services - 250 commercial
banks, 600 savings banks, and 4000 cooperative
banks. In addition, German banking is no more
concentrated than U.S. or other European bank-
ingsystems,and profits inthe domestic German
banking markets appear to be low.
There also are some reasons to believe that uni-
versal-type banking may actually contribute to
the stability of the banking system and the econ-
omy. Bernanke and Gertler, for example, have
theorized that banks withdraw from the credit
intermediation process when they perceive a
deterioration in the collateral value of illiquid
bank assets. Their tendency to do so then exag-
gerates the effects of any economic downturn
that may have triggered the initial perception. If
this theory were true, allowing banks to hold the
equity of borrowing firms could reduce the
incentive for banks to abandon the firms in
adverse times, since abandoning them could
impair the value of equity assets held by the
banks.
Nakatani at Osaka University finds corroborat-
ing evidence in Japanese banking for Bernanke
and Gertler's theory. He finds that the earnings
of firms with intimate relationships with finan-
cial institutions are less variable than those of
firms without. Germany's economy, with its
many examples of universal banks providing
assistance to weakened firms, has been notably
stable in the postwar period.
Effects of deposit protection
A second, thornier issue with universal banking
is whether it is possible for government to
provide some protection against systemic bank-
ing collapse without, ultimately, also shoulder-
ing what should be commercial risks. For
example, if a bank can own corporate equities,
and finance them with default-free debt (insured
deposits), some risk effectively is transferred to
the insuring entity. Similarly, if a commercial
firm can own an insured bank, the possibility
arises that the commercial firm will exploit the
bank to finance risky investments.
Until 1976, Germany did not have explicit
deposit insurance. Instead, it sought to re-assure
depositors through a stated general policy of
protecting the banking system against failure.
The policy still exists and is implemented
through examination, capital regulation, lending
limits, and laws against securities and other
abuse. Evidence on whether this implicit deposit
protection has extended into commerce is
mixed. The fact that the traded equity and ven-
ture capital markets in Germany are very thin,
for example, could suggest that banks enjoy
artificially low costs offunds and out-compete
other finance mechanisms.
In contrast, the prominence of German bank
lending in corporate finance also would be
expected if there were informational and control
advantages to equity interlocks. That is, it need
not signal an exploitation of governmental safety
nets. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact
that the ownership of banks by nonbanks,
although permitted, is not widespread. Using
asset measures, only about 5 percent of German
banks have nonbank parents. This implies that
any funding advantages present in those links
are minor.
Continuing debate
Universal banking has existed in a country that
has enjoyed rapid postwar economic develop-
ment and a relatively stable banking environ-
ment. To the extent that the Germans themselves
have misgivings about their banking system,
they do not appear to be our typical concerns
about the stability of the banking sector or the
desire for the banking system to be more suppor-
tive of business and industry. Rather, the misgiv-
ings seem to focus on universal banking's
potential for concentrating economic power.
This provides an interesting contrast to the con-
tent of debate about banking reform in the
United States.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 207,488 - 1,045 1,904 0.9
Loans and Leases1 6 183,465 - 773 - 1,472 - 0.7
Commercial and Industrial 51,214 - 147 428 0.8
Real estate 72,427 136 5,598 8.3
Loans to Individuals 36,893 - 21 - 4,675 - 11.2
Leases 5,430 15 - 153 - 2.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,639 - 325 3,709 28.6
Other Securities2 7,383 52 - 335 - 4.3
Total Deposits 206,879 379 - 3,061 - 1.4
Demand Deposits 52,180 738 - 4,463 - 7.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,450 - 11 ,832 - 16,267 - 31.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,864
- 157 1,552 8.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,835 - 201 - 151 - 0.1
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,079 - 239 - 2,340 - 5.0
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 31,849 211 - 1,213 - 3.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,660 - 1,151 - 5,152 - 18.5
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change